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ABSTRACT
In this paper we analyze the behavior of stock markets in six emerging countries. More specifically,
we describe the bull and bear cycles of four Latin American and two Asian countries, comparing
their characteristics during both phases and the degree of concordance of bullish periods. We divide
our sample in two subperiods in order to account for differences induced by the financial
liberalization processes that these countries went through in the early 1990's. We find that cycles
in emerging countries tend to have shorter duration and larger amplitude and volatility than in
developed countries. However, after financial liberalization Latin American stock markets have
behaved more similarly to stock markets in developed countries whereas Asian countries have
become more dissimilar. Concordance of cycles across markets has increased significantly over
time, especially for Latin American countries after liberalization.
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During the last decade the emerging markets have been characterized by a high degree
of ﬁnancial instability. This has been particularly the case in Latin America, where
currency crises have become recurrent, and where equity markets have experienced
dramatic swings. Partially motivated by this instability, a number of authors have
recently investigated the behavior of Latin American ﬁnancial markets.1 Fischer
(2002), for example, has analyzed the implications of the Latin American currency
crises for the future of the international monetary system. Eichengreen (2003), De
Gregorio et al. (2000), and Edwards (1999) have investigated the role played by
capital mobility in Latin America during the ﬁnancial crises of the 1990s. Goldstein
(2003) has looked more speciﬁcally at the forces behind the ﬁnancial turmoil in Brazil
during 2002.
Rigobon (2002) has focused on alternative volatility measures in both equity and
bond markets in the period surrounding recent ﬁnancial crises. Kaminsky and Rein-
hart (2002) have investigated how interest rates, equity returns and bond spreads
behave in times of global ﬁnancial stress. Their main interest was to analyze whether
these variables exhibited co-movement across countries. Bekaert and Harvey (2000)
analyzed equity returns in a group of emerging markets, including six Latin American
countries, before and after the ﬁnancial reforms. Edwards and Susmel (2003) inves-
tigated the time pattern of interest rate volatility in four Latin American countries,
1During the late 1980s and early 1990s the vast majority of the Latin American countries em-
barked on ambitious market-oriented reforms. The reform blueprint has come to be known as the
“Washington Consensus.” A number of authors have argued that this reform process has failed, and
that the Latin American countries have grown at slower rates and have become more unstable. For
an analysis of the reforms see, for example, Edwards (1995). See Stiglitz (2002) for criticism of the
reform process. Edwards (2003) assesses the validity of Stiglitz’s critique.
2and compared them to that of Hong Kong. Other recent studies on ﬁnancial volatil-
ity and contagion in the emerging markets, including Latin America, are Karolyi and
Stulz (1996), Eichengreen and Mody (2000), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Bekaert,
Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002a,b), Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2002), Janakiramanan
and Lamba (1998), Chakrabarti and Roll (2002), Edwards (2000) and Chen et al.
(2002).
An important question, and one that we address in this paper, is whether stock
markets have similar features in the emerging nations and in the advanced countries.
The answer to this question is particularly germane to the current debate on the
role of ﬁnancial liberalization and macroeconomic instability in the emerging and
transition economies. Some authors — including Krugman (2000) and Stiglitz (2002)
— have argued that the emerging nations’ ﬁnancial markets are poorly developed and
thus they do not function properly — e.g. in the way advanced countries’ ﬁnancial
markets do. Under these circumstances, the argument goes, the emerging nations
should not liberalize fully their capital markets; instead, they should impose some
form of controls that regulate cross-border movements of portfolio capital.
More speciﬁcally, in this paper we analyze stock market cycles in a group of
Latin American countries: We investigate the characteristics of stock market cycles in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico during 1975 — 2001, and we focus on the behavior
of “bear” and “bull” markets, as deﬁned by Pagan and Sossounov (2003), among
others: “Bull” and “bear” phases of stock markets are identiﬁed with periods of a
generalized upward trend (positive returns) and periods of a generalized downward
trend, respectively.2 We make a distinction between the pre- and post-ﬁnancial reform
2Two explanations have been put forward for the existence of bull and bear markets. One view,
traditionally held by Keynes (1936), Galbraith (1954) and Shiller (1989, 2000) among others, is
3periods of the 1980s and 1990s, and we concentrate on the following characteristics of
stock market cycles: Duration, amplitude and volatility. In addition, we analyze the
extent to which returns depart from a triangular representation, and we investigate
the occurrence of big expansions and contractions. The results from this cycle analysis
a r et h e nu s e dt oc o m p a r et h eb e h a v i o ro ft h e s ef o u rL a t i nA m e r i c a ne q u i t ym a r k e t s
with those of two Asian nations — South Korea and Thailand —, as well as with those
of the US and Germany.
The emerging stock markets analyzed in this paper — Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Mexico, South Korea and Thailand — represent a highly diverse sample: During
the period under consideration they had diﬀerent regulations regarding international
capital mobility, diﬀerent domestic supervisory systems and diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes.3 Moreover, all of them, with the exception of Chile, faced serious crises
during the last few years. This diverse data set, then, allows us to investigate the
behavior of bull and bear markets under diﬀerent institutional settings and under
diﬀerent external environments. We are particularly interested in addressing the
following questions:
• Is it possible to (unequivocally) detect bull and bear markets in these Latin
American and Asian countries?
• Do bull and bear markets in emerging countries behave similarly to those in the
more advanced nations?
that major bull and bear markets are purely due to irrational “animal spirit.” An alternative view
(DeLong, 1992; Siegel, 1998) states that, although prices deviate from fundamentals in the short
run, that is, in periods of months or a few years, in the long run - decades or even generations-
proportional diﬀerences between market prices and fundamentals are kept within bounds. Under
this interpretation, the major bull and bear markets reﬂect large shifts in consensus perceptions of
fundamentals and expectations of the future.
3For details on the characteristics of the ﬁnancial markets in the diﬀerent countries and their
refom processes see Bekaert and Harvey (2000).
4• Has stock market volatility been diﬀerent across these countries? Has it changed
through time? Is stock market volatility diﬀerent in these countries than in the
benchmarks represented by two advanced countries (the US and Germany)?
• How do bear and bull market cycles compare across the emerging markets in
our sample? What do these comparisons tell us — if anything — about the eﬀects of
ﬁnancial liberalization?
• Is it possible to explain the behavior of stock market cycles in our emerging
markets using traditional models, including those in the “random walk” family?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the method-
ology used to identify bull and bear markets. In Section 3 we discuss the results
of our cycle analysis, and we conclude that bear and bull phases have behaved in a
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent way in emerging and advanced countries, but the diﬀerences
seem to diminish in the post-ﬁnancial liberalization period. In Section 4 we deal with
the issue of concordance or synchronicity of the cycles across countries. The main
ﬁndings in this section point at the increasing synchronicity of the stock markets in
emerging countries, which move in a more parallel way during the 1990s than they
did in earlier periods. Both the ﬁnancial liberalization processes of the early 1990s
and the ﬁnancial crises of that decade seem to have contributed to this increased
synchronicity. Section 5 complements the analysis in Sections 3 and 4 by looking at
as p e c i ﬁc characteristic of the cycle that allows for formal signiﬁcance tests on the
shape, and some predictability features, of the cycle phases. Finally, in Section 6 we
present a brief summary of the results and some concluding remarks regarding the
directions for future research that our paper opens.
52 Identifying Market Phases: A Non-Parametric
Approach
There are two main approaches to locating the expansionary / contractionary phases
of the cycles in an economic variable.4 The ﬁrst one advocates a parametric speci-
ﬁcation of the data generating process, where two diﬀerent regimes are allowed, one
that corresponds to the expansions — and therefore contains some type of upward
trend —, and another one that corresponds to the contractions and therefore contains
a downward trend. Examples of this approach are Goodwin (1993), Diebold and
Rudebusch (1996), Kim and Nelson (1999), Hamilton and Lin (1993), Ramchand
and Susmel (1998) and Maheu and McCurdy (2000). The second approach takes
a nonparametric perspective and, instead of ﬁtting a fully speciﬁed statistical data
generating process, looks at the original data series in search for the speciﬁcf e a t u r e s
of the cycle. That is, this procedure looks for periods of generalized upward trend,
which will be identiﬁed with the expansions, and periods of a generalized downward
trend which will be identiﬁed with the contractions. The key feature of the analysis
is the location of turning points, peaks and troughs, in the series. These turning
points determine the diﬀerent phases of the cycle, which can be subsequently ana-
lyzed. This method was ﬁrst applied by Bry and Boschan (1971) to the analysis of
business cycles, and has since been used by Watson (1994), Artis et al. (1996) and
Harding and Pagan (2000, 2002) for business cycles, and by Pagan and Sossounov
4We do not comment on the advantages / disadvantages of one approach vs. the other. A
fascinating discussion can be found in the exchange between Hamilton (2003) and Harding and
Pagan (2003a,b). Alternative methods such as the use of long-returns — twelve month returns, for
example — can also be used to focus on the medium term evolution of the stock market. However,
the two methodologies we comment speciﬁcally attempt to locate the two types of phases — bull and
bear phases — and thus directly address the analysis of stock cycles.
6(2003) and Gómez Biscarri and Pérez de Gracia (2002) for stock market analysis.
In this paper we opt for the nonparametric approach, as it allows for great ﬂexibil-
ity in analyzing some important features of the stock market cycles. In addition, this
approach allows us to compare the actual stock market cycle to parametric bench-
marks, and to investigate issues related to predictability of the market.
We proceed as follows: We ﬁrst identify the stock market phases in our six emerg-
ing countries by locating the peaks and troughs of a stock index. We then compute
a battery of statistics for the phases in each country. This allows us to measure the
main characteristics of Latin American stock markets and to compare their behavior
to that of the Asian countries and of the US and Germany, the two countries we have
chosen as “representatives” of the developed economies.
2.1 Locating Peaks and Troughs
The ﬁrst step in the analysis of the cycle phases requires the location of the turning
p o i n t s—p e a k sa n dt r o u g h st h a ts i g n a lt h ec h a n g ei nt h et r e n do ft h em a r k e t—o ft h e
stock market index.
Throughout the paper,  denotes the natural log of the stock price, .A
peak/trough in the series of stock prices is deﬁned if  is the highest/lowest in a
window of width 8 months.5 That is, there is a peak at  if
[−8−1    +1+8] (1)
and there is a trough at  if
[−8−1    +1+8] (2)
5The results may be slightly sensitive to the choice of the window width. We use eight months,
for a total width of the window of 16 months, as suggested by Pagan and Sossounov (2003).
7In order to ensure that we do not identify spurious phases we include the following
four censoring criteria:
1) We eliminate turns within eight months of the beginning/end of the series.
2) Peaks or troughs next to the endpoints of the series are eliminated if they are
lower/higher than the endpoints.
3) Complete cycles of less than sixteen months of total duration are also elimi-
nated.
4) Phases of less than four months are eliminated unless the fall/rise exceeds 20%
(the traditional rule of thumb for identifying a stock market cumulative movement
as bullish or bearish).
After every censoring operation, alternation is enforced so that a peak will always
follow a trough and viceversa. Alternation is achieved by taking the highest (lowest)
of two consecutive peaks (troughs). In Section 3 we present the results obtained from
applying this approach to dating bull and bear markets in six emerging markets as
well as in the US and Germany.
2.2 Stock Markets Cycles: Duration, Amplitude and Volatil-
ity
Once the bear and bull phases have been identiﬁed, we calculate a battery of statistics
for each country. These statistics allow us to obtain some key information about the
behavior of stock prices in each of the phases. This behavior can then be compared
across countries and across phases, in search for relevant diﬀerences in stock market
evolution. We use ﬁve diﬀerent measures of cyclical behavior. Three directly relate
to the shape of the phases of the cycle, while the other two focus on volatility within
the cycle and on the existence of “big swings.”
8As a preliminary step, we deﬁne a dummy variable, , which takes the value 1 if
there is a bull market at time ,i . e .i f − −1 = ∆ belongs to the bull market.6
Given that  =1if there is a bullish market at , we calculate two ancillary statistics:
Total time spent in an expansion is
P
=1  and total time spent in a contraction
is
P
=1 	,w h e r e	 =1−  is an indicator for bearish market. The Number
of peaks (expansions) can be counted as 
 =
P
=1 (1 − +1) − 1 (NTP is




=1 	(1 − 	+1) − 1.7 We also deﬁne the cumulated change over any
expansion as 
 = −1 +∆, 0 =0 .  contains the running sum of returns
∆ for bullish markets (similar deﬁnition with 	 for bearish markets) with the sum
r e s e tt oz e r ow h e n e v e r =0 .
The ﬁve indicators of the phases of the market that we study are:















2) Amplitude (A): Amplitude of the phases, in percentage, refers to the total
return or total loss from the trough to the peak in a bull market or from the peak to
the trough in the case of a bear market. Given that  =l n ( ), the amplitude of any
single phase can be simply calculated as the sum of returns (∆)o v e rt h ec o m p l e t e
6Throughout the paper we refer to ∆ as “returns” though it more accurately corresponds to
capital gains. Most of the parallel studies (Pagan and Sossounov, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 1999) use
capital gains instead of returns, and we follow that same approach.
7Given that we only analyze complete phases, the initial and ﬁnal phases are not counted. That
i st h er e a s o nf o rt h e“ −1” term in the formulas. However, if the initial and ﬁnal phase are the same,
then the adjustment does not apply to the other type of phase. For example, if the initial and ﬁnal
phases are bullish, the number of complete bull phases would be  =
P
=1 (1−+1)−1 and
the number of bear phases would be  =
P
=1 (1 − +1)














3) Volatility (V): We measure volatility by the average size of the monthly return
















where |∆| is the absolute change of the log of stock prices.
4) Proportion of big expansions (B+) and contractions (B−): The proportion of






























 )a n d( 
 ) represent the cumulative return throughout the
phase and up to time , the summation term is calculating the value of the cumulative
return at the end of the phase, that is, at the peak/trough. This is equivalent to the
amplitude of the phase. The indicator function [] is therefore counting the number
of phases with amplitude bigger than 0.2 or smaller than -0.2.8
5) Excess Index (EX): This index captures deviations of returns in the bullish or
bearish markets from a “triangle approximation.” A pure random walk with no drift
would produce triangular cycles, with excess measures not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero in either bull or bear phases. Random walks with drift tend to produce bullish
8We use 0.2 as a measure of a “big” phase given that a 20% return / loss is the rule of thumb
traditionally used by practitioners to identify the existence of a bull and bear market.
10phases with positive excess measure and bearish phases with negative excess measure,
and this eﬀect is accentuated when autocorrelation or conditional heteroskedasticity
are allowed (See Pagan and Sossounov, 2003 for a detailed discussion). This excess
index is calculated as:
d  =
³




for both expansions and contractions. The ﬁrst and second terms in the numerator
approximate the area between the real path followed by the series (area b )a n dt h e
triangular path (area measured by 05 b · b ). The third term corrects for the discrete
approximation used in computing the real path with b .9 The denominator makes
the measure relative to the size of the phase. Figure 1 shows the possible shapes of
the market phases and their relation to the sign of the EX index.
[Insert Figure 1]
3 Bull and Bear Phases in Selected Emerging Mar-
kets: Basic Results
We use monthly data on stock returns for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mexico
and Thailand. These data correspond to the S&P/IFCG Emerging Market Indexes
of Standard & Poor’s, formerly calculated by the IFC.10 The series run from 1975:12





























This measure is a discrete time approximation to the integral below (above) the bull (bear) market.
10These indexes, formerly calculated by the IFC, are dollar denominated price indexes of the stock
markets in each country. We use the Global index and not the Investable, which is a narrower index
11to 2001:01, thus yielding a total of 302 observations spanning 26 years.11
Starting in the late 1980s, all six countries in our sample embarked on major
ﬁnancial reform processes that resulted in a liberalization of ﬁnancial transactions
and in growing domestic capital markets. An important question, and one that is at
the center of recent criticisms of the reform process and the “Washington Consensus,”
is whether stock market cycles have exhibited an increase in amplitude and volatility —
i.e. increased instability — in the post-ﬁnancial liberalization era. In order to address
this issue, in the analysis that follows we make a distinction between the pre and
post-liberalization periods. We follow Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001, Table 1)





• South Korea: 1992
• Thailand: 1988
For each country the turning points that deﬁne the phases were estimated using
the methodology described in Section 2.1. Figure 2 contains the evolution of the
stock indexes for each of the countries, where the bullish periods have been shaded to
that is only available from the 1990’s on. The S&P/IFC Global index represents the performance of
the most active stocks in each market analyzed and attempts to be the broadest possible indicator
of market movements, corresponding to at least 75% of total capitalization. For further information
on these widely used indexes, consult www.standardandpoors.com.
11Data availability and comparability also dictated the ﬁnal set of countries analyzed. Some local
indexes, such as Brazil’s Bovespa and Chile’s IGPA, were available for longer periods, but we opted
for using a uniformly calculated index to make comparison across countries more meaningful and
not subject to the diﬀerent methodologies used by the countries. Still, one would ideally use as long
as e r i e sa sp o s s i b l e .
12facilitate visual inspection. The graphs include four lines that signal the four major
ﬁnancial crises that aﬀected emerging markets (EM’s) in the 1990s: The Mexican
crisis (identiﬁed in December 1994), the Asian crisis (September 1997), the Russian
crisis (August 1998) and the Brazilian crisis (January 1999).
[Insert Figure 2]
The dates of the estimated peaks and troughs for each country, along with those
of the US are shown in Table 1. The table has been arranged so that the lining up
of peaks and troughs can be easily examined visually. The ﬁrst ﬁnding that comes
from inspection of both the graphs and the dates in Table 1 is that all recent major
ﬁnancial crises in our sample erupted several months into the bear phase. Moreover,
in some cases the crisis erupts very close to the end of a bear cycle. This is, for
instance, the case of the December 1994 Mexican crisis, which happened two months
before the trough in February 1995 and after the country had spent a whole year in
a bear phase. Korea and Thailand had spent a considerable time in a bear phase
(three and one and a half years, respectively) before the Asian crisis exploded. The
markets in both countries took almost an additional year to bottom out and start the
recovery. In Brazil, the January 1999 crisis coincides with the trough of an 18 month
bear market. Argentina, ﬁnally, reached a peak in February 2000, which means that
by the time of the crisis in late 2001 the Argentine market had spent almost two years
in a bear phase.12 This ﬁnding, however, should be taken with a grain of salt. Indeed,
although our results are highly suggestive, they do not necessarily imply that bear
markets are good predictors of currency and ﬁnancial crises. Answering this question
12Notice that this is also the case for earlier crises, such as the Mexican crisis of August 1982.
13fully is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.13
[Insert Table 1]
Table 2 presents results for the ﬁve statistics calculated for both the bull and bear
markets in our six EM’s. Additionally, we include the values of these statistics for
the US and German stock markets.14 The Table consists of three panels, that present
the results of the full sample, and the results for the pre and post-reform periods.15
The data on the US and Germany in Panel B correspond to the 1975-1989 period;
those in Panel C are for 1990-2001.
[Insert Table 2]
The results for the two subperiods are particularly interesting, and indicate that,
contrary to what the critics of the market oriented reform processes have argued, the
degree of equity markets instability has declined in our four Latin American nations
after the crises. The main results in Table 2 may be summarized as follows:
Duration: After the ﬁnancial reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, average
duration of bear markets declined in all four Latin American countries, as it did in
Thailand. In Korea, on the other hand, average duration of bear markets increased
in the post reform period. The duration of bull markets declined in the post-reform
period in four of the six emerging markets — the exceptions being Argentina and
Mexico.
13The crisis early warnings model developed by Goldman Sachs (2002) does include a decline in
the stock market as a useful leading indicator.
14These results correspond to our own calculation for the US market during the period 1975:01
to 2000:12, using the turning points estimated by Pagan and Sossounov (2003). In the case of the
German market, the results correspond to the period from 1970:01 to 1999:11 estimated by Gómez
Biscarri and Pérez de Gracia (2002).
15The data for the diﬀerent emerging markets have been divided by using as the split date the
peak or trough that is the closest to the liberalization date, so that we keep complete phases both
in the pre and post-reform periods.
14As a consequence, in the most recent (post-reform) period duration of bear mar-
kets continues to be higher and duration of bull markets continues to be lower in all
six emerging markets than in the US.
Amplitude: The amplitude of both bull and bear phases has been signiﬁcantly
larger in the emerging countries than in the developed nations. Emerging stock
markets seem to oﬀer a signiﬁcant premium, or excess return, during expansions, that
compensates for the big losses during contractions, and for the substantially higher
volatility. For the emerging markets there appears to be an ordering of countries,
where those with bigger gains are also those with bigger losses. This phenomenon is
also present in the case of European nations analyzed by Gómez Biscarri and Pérez de
Gracia (2002). The ﬁgures for the emerging countries are staggering, though: During
the 25 year period, average gains during bullish periods range from 79% (Korea)
to 142% (Argentina); average losses during bearish periods go from 68% (Korea) to
123% (Argentina).16
Although amplitude of both bull and bear markets continues to be very high
in comparison to the US and Germany, it has declined in all four Latin American
countries during the post-reform period. In the two Asian countries, on the other
hand, the amplitude of bear phases goes up dramatically in the post-reform period,
mostly because of the inﬂuence of the Asian crises. Amplitude of bull phases in Asia
is similar in the pre- and post-reform periods.
Volatility: Within each phase volatility is generally much larger in the emerging
markets than in advanced countries. This is the case both in the pre- and post-reform
16Note that when the returns are signiﬁcantly large in absolute value, using  − −1 =l n ( ) −





−1 , and a loss bigger
than 100% is actually possible. For example, if  =2 5and −1 =1 0 0 ,t h eﬁrst formula results in
a 139% loss whereas the second results in a 75% loss.
15periods. However, in the post ﬁnancial liberalization period, volatility has declined
signiﬁcantly in every Latin American country in our sample. Notice that the value of
volatility is smaller in the second subperiod for bull phases in all four Latin American
countries and for bear phases in Argentina, Chile and Mexico. In the case of Asian
countries, on the other hand, their markets evolved in the opposite way, and after
1990 their stock market ﬂuctuations seem to behave more like those of pre-1990s
Latin America: Volatility of both bull and bear phases is larger in post-reform Korea
and Thailand than before ﬁnancial liberalization.
The increased volatility of bear phases in the second subperiod for Brazil, Korea
and Thailand is mostly attributable to their own, very profound and unique, crises,
and not to increased general instability: Notice that no volatility increase happened
in the bull periods of Brazil or in either phase in Argentina, Chile and Mexico.
Consequently, these ﬁndings cast some doubt on the statements by critics of ﬁnancial
liberalization which point at a generalized increase in volatility following the opening
of emerging capital markets.
Excess Index: As reﬂected in Table 2, the values of the EX index for our emerging
countries diﬀer substantially from those of the US or Germany. The EM’s tend to
present widely varying EX indexes in both bull and bear phases. The signs are not
always positive and negative respectively, but some present bull phases with negative
value of the EX index and bear phases with positive value. This evidence on the EX
index is in line with one of the key ﬁndings in Pagan and Sossounov (2003): Stock
market phases do not look triangular, as it would be implied by a simple random
walk. Instead the beginning and end of both the bull and bear phase display some
“acceleration,” by which the large returns or losses are not distributed evenly across
16the phase, but are instead concentrated close to one of the turning points. It would
be tempting to automatically identify these nonzero values of the EX index with
a departure from the random walk behavior and therefore from unpredictability, as
it is done by Pagan and Sossounov. However, Gómez Biscarri and Pérez de Gracia
(2002) show that this is not exactly correct. Simulations in their paper prove that
a random walk with drift but no autocorrelation — and therefore, unpredictable be-
yond the regular market return — generates cycles with EX measures signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in both phases. This implies that our results for the EM’s could
be consistent with stock markets following random walks with drift, with or without
autocorrelated returns. If one wants to use the EX index to test for the existence of
some predictability in the market or for departures from the random walk behavior
the values of the index that are consistent with statistical models of unpredictable
returns need, thus, to be calculated case by case. We take up this task, which yields
important conclusions, in the last section of the paper.
Big Expansions and Contractions: The 	+ and 	− suggest that during the post-
reform subsample most bear phases have been “bigger” than in the pre-reform period.
Indeed, as these indexes show, after 1990 all contractions of Latin American and Asian
stock markets have been large, except one in Chile, the country whose cycles look
more similar to those of the developed economies. We attribute this eﬀect mostly to
the eﬀect of the Asian crisis — notice that there are fewer years in the post-reform
period, and thus fewer bear phases — and not to the increased instability: As we
have seen in the results on amplitude and volatility the evidence favors a generalized
reduction in instability, once the eﬀect of the bear market caused by the Asian crisis
is isolated.
174 Financial Reforms and Stock Market Cycles Across
Countries
In this section we extend our bull and bear markets analysis and look at the joint
evolution of the six emerging stock markets investigated above. We are particularly
interested in understanding whether stock market phases tend to “coincide” in time
across emerging countries. That is, we try to identify whether, at a given moment
in time, stock markets in EM’s are in the same phase of the stock market cycle. We
also try to ascertain whether this comovement or concordance across equity markets
has intensiﬁed during the post-reform period. Since during the late 1980s and early
1990s these countries relaxed their controls on international capital mobility, we would
expect an increase in the degree of comovement across their equity markets.17
The rest of the section is organized as follows. First, we provide a simple analysis
that compares the timing of the peaks and troughs of the stock market series across
time. This analysis shows how coincident in time the turning points have been across
our Latin American and Asian countries. Then we look more formally at the long run
coincidence of the phases. We provide statistical measures of the degree of bilateral
coincidence of bull and bear markets across countries throughout the entire sample.
Finally, we show a dynamic measure of concordance that tracks the evolution of the
synchronicity of cycle phases during the most recent post-reform years. This latter
measure allows us to comment on whether the stock markets of our EM’s have become
more concordant over time.
17The fact that emerging markets’ equities are considered to be an “asset class” provides greater
support to the hypothesis that comovements across these countries should have increased in the
post-reform period.
184.1 Peaks and Troughs in Bull and Bear Phases
In Table 1 we presented the peaks and troughs identiﬁed for the equity cycles of our
four Latin American nations, the two Asian nations and the US. These data show
that before the ﬁnancial market liberalizations of the late 1980s and early 1990s the
peaks and troughs of our six emerging countries were not aligned at all. Furthermore,
they were not aligned with those identiﬁed for the US. In fact, all six countries seemed
to follow widely diﬀering patterns before 1990. For example, Argentina’s phases from
1975 to 1987 do not have a single turning point in common with, or within a seven
month window of, those of Brazil. The same holds true for the rest of the countries:
Peaks and troughs do not coincide in time until the US stock market crisis of 1987,
when three of the EM’s — Argentina, Brazil and Mexico — present a trough almost
simultaneously to that in the US. It is slightly surprising that it is the troughs that
coincide in time, and not the peaks. This leads to think that US investors pulled
out of both the US and international markets at the time of the crisis, regardless of
whether the markets were going up or down, and when the market recovered, capital
ﬂowed back into all four markets simultaneously.18 After the crash, turning points
become misaligned again until 1990 when, coinciding with the worldwide recession,
Brazil, Chile, Korea, Thailand and the US present a trough.
After 1990, a time when the countries in our sample had either initiated, or were
about to launch their reforms, individual cycles begin to exhibit evident comovement.
With the exception of Korea, that does not present a cycle in 1996-1997, the other
18The literature on the eﬀects of the 1987 US stock market crisis is by now abundant. King and
Wadhwami (1990), Lee and Kim (1993) and Choudhry (1996) are among the earlier contributions
that document an increase in world stock market comovements after the crisis. Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) review some of those contributions in the context of contagion of ﬁnancial crises.
19ﬁve countries all present very similar patterns, with peaks around the second quarter
of 1992, one during 1994, one in late 1997 (around the time of the Asian crisis), and
a ﬁnal peak in early 2000. Troughs also come almost simultaneously in late 1992,
early 1995 (after the peso crisis in Mexico) and a ﬁnal one in late 1998, following
the Russian crisis. Only Brazil seemed to be aﬀe c t e db yi t so w nc r i s i s :I ti st h eo n l y
country whose stock market did not bottom out in September 1998 at the time of
the LTCM crisis — as did all the others —, but kept its downward slide until January
1999, when it started to recover after the devaluation of the real.
It is interesting to note that the diﬀerent ﬁnancial crises of the 1990s had dissimilar
eﬀects across EM’s. According to the data, the Mexican crisis aﬀected Argentina and
B r a z i l ,b u ti td i dn o ta ﬀect Chile, Korea or Thailand. In contrast, all six countries
were signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the collapse of the Asian markets in 1997. We do not
have enough data on the Russian equity market in order to carry a similar analysis
of the eﬀects of that crisis on Russia’s own market. However, it can be seen that the
Russian crisis of August 1998 did not have any noticeable eﬀects in the EM’s in our
sample. In fact, it seems that the crisis marked the beginning of the recovery after
the Asian ﬂu, rather than sending the markets into another downslide. As mentioned
above, the crisis in Brazil did not spillover to other markets.19
These ﬁndings suggest that in the post-reform period, emerging equity markets —
or at least the emerging markets considered in this paper — were becoming signiﬁcantly
more integrated with each other. We turn now to a more formal analysis of the
concordance or synchronicity of the stock market phases in our EM’s.
19Notice that we do not pretend to have established statistical causality.
204.2 Concordance of the Cycle Phases: Are the Cycles Aligned?
In order to analyze formally the extent of the comovements of the stock market data
in our six emerging countries, we use an index of synchronicity of the bull and bear
phases which allows us to compare statistically the degree of alignment or concordance
of the cycle phases in two or more countries. This index of phase concordance is the
concordance index (), used in Harding and Pagan (2000, 2002). This index is














































 =1identiﬁes a bullish market at time  in country  and 		
 =1identiﬁes
a bearish market at time  in country . This index calculates the number of the 
periods for which the two countries are in the same phase, either bull or bear, and
averages out over the  periods.20
The values of the  range from zero (perfect misalignment of phases) to one
20This index is, in our view, superior to cross-correlations of returns. Indeed, cross-correlations
have four main limitations. First, unconditional cross-correlations of returns are subject to sectorial
composition of the stock indexes and do not account for movements in fundamentals (see Wolf, 1996).
Second, the use of simple cross-correlations would be aﬀected by the existence, not infrequent in the
case of stock market movements, of outliers. By identifying the phases with a binary variable, we
avoid the artiﬁcial increase in cross-correlation that results from extremely big returns. Third, given
that returns have an upward drift, the correlation of returns tends to be positive and statistically
signiﬁcant due to that trending behavior. Given that we are not interested in the concordance or
correlation per se, but on the concordance of the innovation to the return process - which expresses
the way new information aﬀects returns - the correlation would have to be computed with the
estimated residuals of the return process, thus being subject to the statistical process that returns
are assumed to follow. Fourth, the behavior of volatility or of higher moments of the returns would
also aﬀect the cross-correlation measure of the concordance of cycles, whereas the 
 is invariant
to the underlying distribution of returns once the phases have been identiﬁed. Finally, we are not
interested in forecasting returns or in the short term movements of the market: Our main concern is
to calculate the concordance of phases in the stock markets, and these phases correspond to medium
to long run movements. Using cross-correlations of returns would put too much emphasis on short
term movements. The methodology used to construct the phase indicators guarantees that we focus
on the medium term trends of the stock market. For these ﬁve reasons we believe that the 

provides a more intuitive measure of the concordance of the cycle phases, and, given the objective
of our study, a more correct one.
21(perfect alignment). However, given that random walks with drift generate cycles
with longer and bigger bullish phases than bearish phases, it is clear that even if
the shocks to the random walks are perfectly independent, the  will be slightly
bigger than 0.5, the value we would obtain if the phases were purely random draws
from a 50:50 Bernoulli distribution. Therefore, a formal signiﬁcance test requires us to
calculate the critical values in a case by case fashion. Thus, we simulated independent
random walks with the same drift, return autocorrelation and variance as the series
in each country. Then we calculated the simulated distribution of all bilateral ’s
and found the interval contained between the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. When the
empirical index is outside of that conﬁdence interval, the hypothesis that the two
series have phases that come from independent processes can be rejected. This gives
evidence of signiﬁcant concordance of stock market behavior in those two countries.21
Table 3 presents the ’s for the diﬀerent pairs of countries. In Table 4 and
for comparison purposes we include the simple cross correlations of returns, for the
same sample period. Each table includes three panels. The ﬁrst panel contains the
values of the indexes for the full sample. The second and third panels split the
sample into two subperiods: Given our discussion above, we analyze the concordance
of market phases before and after ﬁnancial liberalization, although given that the
dates of liberalization are slightly diﬀerent for the diﬀerent countries, we use now
21Notice that this is also the case for the coeﬃcients of correlation of returns: Traditional critical
values for signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient of correlation between two series are biased downward for
time series with a drift and autocorrelation in returns. Thus, the signiﬁcance test would have to be
performed on the innovations to the two series, estimated by ﬁrst ﬁt t i n gas t a t i s t i c a lm o d e lt ot h e
returns. Given the higher dependency that these estimated innovations would have on the speciﬁc
model chosen to ﬁt the returns, we have opted against oﬀering a signiﬁcance test for the simple
coeﬃcients of correlation. However, we still use their evolution in time and their magnitude to
compare the results to those of the 
 a n do ft h e
 (next subsection).
221990 as the common splitting date.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4]
The values of the  for the full sample (1975-2000) are not particularly inter-
esting; they are in general larger than 0.5, but most of them are not signiﬁcant. The
exceptions to this result are the pairs Argentina-Mexico, Chile-Mexico and Thailand
with Korea and Mexico.22 However, once we split the sample into the pre-1990 and
the post-1990 years, the evidence changes. For the pre-1990 period only Chile and
Mexico, among our Latin American countries, show evidence of a signiﬁcant con-
cordance. Interestingly enough, Thailand is the only country showing signiﬁcant
comovements, negative in the case of Brazil, with more than one country. In spite of
this, however, we interpret the overall evidence in Panel B of Table 3 as suggesting
quite strongly that before 1990 concordance of cycles among EM’s was rather weak
and generally non signiﬁcant.
Panel C in Table 3 presents the ’s for the post 1990 period. As may be seen,
during this period the Latin American equity markets become signiﬁcantly concor-
dant: In the second subperiod, Argentina shows positive concordance with Brazil
and Mexico, and, weaker, with Thailand. Brazil shows concordance with Mexico
and Chile. Chile, on the other hand, sees the concordance of its market phases in-
crease with respect to Brazil and Korea, but decrease with respect to Mexico. Notice
that after 1990 evidence for concordance of phases in the Thai stock market weakens
22The values of the 
’s are parallel to those of the simple coeﬃcients of correlation. Estimated
correlation coeﬃcients tend to be positive and small. The highest values correspond to the pairs
of countries with higher bilateral 
, and, as we have highlighted in the table, the 
’s that are
statistically signiﬁcant correspond to the highest values of the simple correlations, those above




These results suggest that it is possible to distinguish three groups of countries
during the post reform period. The ﬁrst one is a closely linked group formed by
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Notice that all three of these countries faced crises
during this period, and throughout most of the period under consideration they were
not classiﬁed as investment grade countries by the rating agencies. The second group
is formed by Chile and Korea, that have become more concordant with each other,
but less concordant with other countries. While Korea faced a massive crisis in 1997,
Chile did not have one during this period. Nevertheless, both of these countries were
investment grade during most of the 1990-2000. Finally, Thailand doesn’t seem to ﬁt
with any of the other two groups. During 1990-2000 its concordance with all other
countries, except perhaps with Argentina, declines. It is interesting to note that,
although the  is quite high for all US-other country pairs, it is only statistically
signiﬁcant for Mexico and Argentina. This indicates that while the emerging markets
have become signiﬁcantly more integrated among themselves, the degree of integration
w i t ht h eU Se q u i t ym a r k e th a sn o tn e c e s s a r i l yp r o c e e d e da tt h es a m ep a c e .
We now analyze whether a more dynamic analysis of the time evolution of the
concordance indexes supports a story of increased market concordance.
4.3 Is there a Tendency Toward Further Concordance?
Instead of focusing on two subperiods — pre- and post-liberalization — we analyze
whether the degree of concordance has tended to change — gradually, perhaps —
through time. More speciﬁcally, we are interested in ﬁnding out if after the reforms
there is a tendency towards an increased degree of concordance across countries. In
24general, one would expect that ﬁnancial reforms that open up domestic ﬁnancial mar-
kets — even if they do so partially — would increase the extent of market comovement
across countries. This would be particularly the case if the countries in question are
considered to form a (semi) homogeneous “asset class.” Indeed, even if restrictions
to capital mobility are only partially lifted, we would expect a (gradual) increase in
the  through time. In order to address this issue we calculate a set of rolling ’s



























 a r ep l o t t e di nF i g u r e s3 - 6 . 23 For compar-
ison purposes, in these ﬁgures we also include the evolution of rolling coeﬃcients of


















where 	 corresponds to the return ∆ for country  during period  and 	 is the
average return for country  during the 50 periods in the rolling window.
[Insert Figures 3-6]
The ’s and ’s give information about the evolution in the behavior of
concordance in the emerging countries in our sample. A trend upward (downward)
in the index signals increased (decreased) stock market concordance.
23Formal signiﬁcance testing should be performed by simulating the distribution of the critical
values. We simulated critical values for the 
’s by generating series with the estimated drift and
return autocorrelation of each of the four countries, calculating the 
’s for each simulated series
a n dt a k i n gt h e2 . 5 %a n dt h e9 7 . 5 %p e r c e n t i l e so ft h es i m u l a t e dv a l u e si ne a c hp e r i o d .G i v e nt h a t
t h ed r i f t sf o rt h ed i ﬀerent countries are similar, the conﬁdence bands for the 
 for each country
pair turn out to be also similar, with 0.72 being the upper critical value. For simplicity, we do not
include the conﬁdence bands in the graphs, although these are available upon request.
25The rolling cross correlations of returns presented in these ﬁgures were never
substantially high, in either direction, during the ﬁrst years of the sample. The trend
reverses, however, after the early 1990s, when an increase in correlations is evident,
especially among Latin American countries. Concordance of cycle phases has also
tended to be quite high in the years after liberalization; indeed, this index moves close
to one in the last periods for a number of country-pairs. There are some diﬀerences
in the evolution of both measures, though, that make the two complementary rather
than redundant. For example, Brazil and Chile during the early 1980s presented a
very signiﬁcant negative concordance of cycles, whereas correlations gave no evidence
of a signiﬁcant relationship. Another interesting diﬀerence appears in the case of
Chile with the other three Latin American countries. Return correlations start to
trend up in the mid 1990s, whereas the concordance of phases only starts to increase
well after the Asian crisis. Consequently, both measures tell the same story about
the high concordance of Latin American markets after ﬁnancial liberalization, but the
dynamic behavior identiﬁed is rather diﬀerent. We believe that the main limitation
of cross correlations in our setting is that the abnormal returns during the crises
in the second half of the 1990s generate large “outliers” that tend to blur the real
concordance of the behavior of the stock markets in the medium term.
The ’s in Figures 3-6 suggest that equity markets in our Latin American
countries have become increasingly concordant in the last few years. This trend has
been persistent, as it is the case of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, or it has had ups and
downs for the pairs Chile-Argentina and Chile-Mexico. The case of Chile — the only
country in the sample that did not suﬀer a currency crisis during the post reform
period — is particularly interesting. As mentioned above, the  of Chile with
26Argentina and Mexico drops signiﬁcantly at the time of the Tequila crisis, reﬂecting
the fact that Chile did not suﬀer from Mexican-originated contagion (Edwards and
Susmel, 2003), and it stays low through the Asian crisis. In both cases the ’s
recover pre-crisis levels by the end of the sample, thus signaling that the Chilean
economy has indeed become highly concordant with its close neighbors but at the
same time it is somehow insured against contagion from crises that aﬀect its neighbors.
Korea and Thailand show high concordance of states and correlation of returns
with each other only in the last two years. Thus, the Asian ﬂu did not bring about
a higher comovement of the two markets, which up to that moment seemed to have
evolved quite independently from each other and also with respect to Latin American
countries. After experiencing a decline during the latter part of the 1980s and early
1990s, the ’s for Korea end up being well above signiﬁcance levels with respect to
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, although they never reach levels similar to those of the
Latin American countries among themselves. Thailand, on the other hand, does not
show signs of concordance with any Latin American country except, maybe, Chile.
It did show signiﬁcant concordance in the earlier years — before the crisis, around the
liberalization dates —, but this concordance has in fact decreased in recent periods.
Our results therefore show strong concordance of Latin American stock markets
and a clear tendency towards stronger concordance in the most recent years, especially
after ﬁnancial liberalization. Korea and Thailand have become less concordant with
respect to all the other countries although Korea seems to be recovering and entering
in phase again with the Latin American countries in the most recent years.
These ﬁndings suggest that liberalization processes have indeed contributed to a
much stronger comovement of the stock markets in the emerging countries — both in
27the short term, as measured by the correlations of returns, and in the medium term,
as measured by the concordance indices —, and this result is quite consistent across
the board. The ﬁnancial crises have introduced some noise in these relationships,
especially around the years of the Asian ﬂu. After the eﬀects of the Asian crisis
died away — the Russian and Brazilian crisis did not have a similar eﬀect — all Latin
American countries and Korea give evidence of strong comovement, whereas Thailand
seems to have become detached from the rest of the group. These results are in
contrast with studies such as Wolf (1996), that claim that Asian equity markets have
experienced a big increase in the degree of comovement during the 1990s whereas
comovements for the Latin American countries remained small even after the reforms.
5 The Shape of Emerging Cycle Phases: A Simu-
lation Exercise
One of the advantages of our approach is that it allows us to compare the actual
stock market cycle to benchmarks characterized by random walk-type models. As
pointed out above, if the true data generating process is indeed a random walk, the
cyclical behavior would follow a triangular path. If, however, empirical cycles depart
from those generated by a random walk, the cyclical pattern could take a number of
alternative forms. Figure 1 depicted the four possible shapes of the market behavior
depending on whether the market is bullish or bearish and on the sign of the EX
index.24
24In theory, all ﬁve cycle characteristics discussed in Section 2 could be used in this way to test
some statistical model. However, it turns out that most statistical models can replicate fairly well all
measures except for the excess index. This index, therefore, turns out to be the one that can most
successfully be used for a formal testing of whether a statistical model is consistent with observed
market behavior.
28In order to gain a deeper understanding of whether stock market phases depart
from what random walk-based models would imply, we perform a simulation exper-
iment.25 First we ﬁt three statistical models of returns to all six of our markets for
the three diﬀerent subperiods — full sample, 1975-1989 and 1990-2001. These three
models diﬀer with respect to the behavior of the volatility of the error term. The
three models estimated are:26
I) A random walk with drift and AR(1) increments
∆ =  + ∆−1 +   → (01) (11)
II) A random walk with drift and AR(1)/GARCH(1,1) eﬀects
∆ =  + ∆−1 +   → (01) (12)
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III) A random walk with drift and AR(1)/EGARCH(1,1) eﬀects
∆ =  + ∆−1 +   → (01) (13)
ln
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Note that all three models include the possibility of returns being autocorrelated,
and therefore if there is indeed some autocorrelation in the market, it will show up in
the coeﬃcient .27 We are therefore interested in detecting features that may point
at predictabilities beyond that of a simple autocorrelation of returns.
25Our procedure is a parametric bootstrap where we simulate returns from the implied distribution
it falls under the category of parametric bootstrap (Maddala and Li, 1996).
26These three models have been chosen because they are the ones that best replicate the features
of the empirical cycles (see Pagan and Sossounov, 2003). More complicated models such as regime-
switching models or processes with stochastic volatility have been analyzed, but their performance
in ﬁtting the features of the data is much poorer than that of the three simpler models we consider.
27Strictly speaking, therefore, if  6=0the three models are not random walks. We do not comment
on the values of the estimated coeﬃcients. Across countries and for the three diﬀerent estimation
periods, the values of  diﬀer substantially, some of them being statistically signiﬁcant.
29Second, we simulated 1,000 series of returns — of length equal to the number of
observations available in each country’s stock market series — for all six countries,
given the estimated parameters for the above three models. We calculated the excess
measures for each of the 1,000 simulated series and constructed the simulated distri-
bution of the excess measure under each of the three models. From these simulated
distributions we ﬁnd the 2.5% and 97.5% critical values.
Third, we compared the values of the empirical excess measures estimated for the
original series of the four countries (fourth and tenth rows in Table 2), with the critical
values that result from simulating the stock market with the estimated parameters
of the three models.28 The results of the simulated critical values for the diﬀerent
countries and models appear in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3]
These results indicate that all three statistical models fail to replicate correctly the
value of the EX index for all of our countries. Moreover, this failure is not symmetric
across time periods or across phases. In fact, the divergence between the  indexes
implied by the three random walk models and the computed  indexes is more
noticeable during bull markets in the 1975-1989 period, and during bear markets in
the 1990-2001 period.
Period 1975-1989: Indeed, the shape of bull phases during the 1975-1989 period
is only well replicated for Korea, for which an EGARCH speciﬁcation seems coherent
with the empirical value of the index. However, for the other ﬁve countries the
empirical value of the EX index is signiﬁcantly outside the simulated conﬁdence
28All parameter values are available upon request. We omit them from the exposition in order to
simplify the discussion.
30interval. In the case of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Thailand the shape of the bull
phase tends to be like that in Figure 1B, where the market accelerates as the peak
is being reached. In the case of Chile, the shape corresponds to that in Figure 1A,
so the bigger returns are located at the beginning of the expansion. Bear phases,
on the other hand, are correctly replicated for Argentina and Chile, but not for the
two Asian countries — where bear phases resemble Figure 1D, with the big negative
returns present at the beginning of the phase — or for Brazil and Mexico — where the
phases behave as in Figure 1C, with an acceleration of the negative returns at the
end of the phase.
Period 1990-2001: It is interesting to note that in this post liberalization period
bull phases are well accounted for in the cases of Brazil, Chile, Korea and Mexico.
In other words, bull phases of most emerging markets become consistent with simple
statistical models of returns. Argentina and Thailand, however, still show some
departures — the phases in both countries having the shape in Figure 1B — but the
magnitude of the departure is smaller than in the period prior to liberalization. Bear
phases present another regularity. In all cases — except Thailand — the phases after
liberalization resemble Figure 1C: Large negative returns are present at the end of
the bear phase, when the market is reaching the bottom of the cycle. This would be
in line with the ﬁnding that the troughs tended to come a few months after the onset
of the diﬀerent ﬁnancial crises, and thus provide with some evidence in favor of the
usefulness of the EX index in characterizing stock market behavior.
It seems, therefore, that with ﬁnancial liberalization the behavior of the stock
markets in emerging economies became more in line with what would be implied
by simple models of stock market behavior — compatible with market eﬃciency or
31with some mild predictability. Gómez Biscarri and Pérez de Gracia (2002) also found
some departures from the random walk excess measure in their analysis of European
markets. In the case of Europe, departures were much smaller in magnitude and non-
signiﬁcant in most of the cases, but they were of a similar form to those we detect in
the post-liberalization period for emerging countries. This also reinforces the ﬁnding
in Section 3, where emerging stock markets were found to become more similar to
those in developed economies after ﬁnancial liberalization.
These results are also important for they point at a feature of stock market pre-
dictability that cannot easily be accommodated by traditional statistical models and
that is not apparent from a casual examination of the series. Figure 2 does give
some evidence of this result, but it is always diﬃcult to disentangle the part of the
departure from the triangle path that could be due to the drift of the random walk,
or to variance eﬀects. More complicated processes, such as stochastic volatility or
regime switching models also fail to replicate this eﬀect, plus they do a very poor
job in replicating some of the other features (see Pagan, 2002, Pagan and Sossounov,
2003, and Gómez Biscarri and Pérez de Gracia, 2002). In the case of a two regime
switching model (Hamilton, 1989), for example, the two regimes are indeed identiﬁed
with the bull and bear phases, but no distinction is made between the behavior of
the series during the ﬁrst and last months of each of the phases, a feature that, as we
have seen, appears in the data analyzed.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The possible consequences of ﬁnancial liberalization processes in Latin America con-
t i n u et ob eas u b j e c to fd i s c u s s i o na n dc o n t r o v e r s y .F o rs o m er e s e a r c h e r s ,t h ea l l e g e d
32short term increase in instability may prevent countries from reaping the longer term
gains.29 Consequently, the analysis of the medium term eﬀects of ﬁnancial opening
and its relation with induced instability becomes a key aspect of the broad research
project of understanding ﬁnancial market transitions in emerging economies. In this
paper we have analyzed some of the implications for stock market behavior of the
ﬁnancial liberalization process in Latin America and Asia. In order to emphasize the
medium term eﬀects, our analysis is focused not on simple returns but on the cycles of
the stock market, which characterize the stock market behavior over longer periods.
We analyzed the characteristics of market cycles — distinguishing the bull and bear
phases — for four Latin American and two Asian countries. In addition to identifying
the bull and bear phases in the stock price cycles we measured several characteristics
of the phases, such as duration, amplitude, volatility within the phase and the shape
of the cycle.
We placed special emphasis on the possible diﬀerences in behavior caused by
the ﬁnancial liberalization processes. We found that, while the characteristics of the
stock market cycles in emerging markets diﬀer quite markedly from those in developed
economies — namely, bull phases tend to be shorter, bear phases are longer, amplitude
and volatility of both phases is signiﬁcantly higher than in developed markets —, the
ﬁnancial liberalization processes have contributed to making Latin American stock
markets more similar to those in more developed economies. Latin American stock
markets after liberalization are less unstable: Volatility is lower in both cycle phases
and the amplitude of the phases has been signiﬁcantly reduced, coming closer to
that of developed countries. This is not the case, however, for Asian countries, that
29For example, Aizenman (2002) examines the apparent trade-oﬀ between the short-term induced
instability and the long-run contribution to growth caused by ﬁnancial opening.
33seem to have been aﬀected too intensely by the ﬁnancial crisis of late 1997. There is
evidence that these countries, especially Korea, are recovering their stability in the
most recent years, but it is still too early to assess the medium-term consequences —
if any — of the crisis.
We also calculated concordance indexes for the countries in the sample, in an
attempt to detect whether the countries tend to be in the same phase of the stock
market cycle or not, and whether there has been a tendency for concordance to
increase over time. We showed that the behavior pre and post ﬁnancial reform has
changed signiﬁcantly, generally leading to a higher concordance of Latin American
countries, which by the end of our sample period were in almost perfect synchronicity,
and to a lower concordance of the Asian countries. These results are parallel, although
some diﬀerences have been noted, to those based on correlations of returns. The
analysis based on return correlations, however, is probably aﬀected too much by
short-term movements of the market and, given the signiﬁcant presence of outlying
returns during crisis periods, they tend to give a distorted picture of the medium
term evolution of the individual markets and of their concordance.
An interesting corollary is obtained from the analysis of the shape of the cycle
phases. Before ﬁnancial liberalization, the shape of the cycles in Latin American and
Asian countries revealed signiﬁcant predictabilities, by which returns showed “accel-
eration” patterns depending on the closeness to the turning point — peak or trough.
These patterns were more marked than those in developed economies, thus making
the evolution of the stock market more predictable and signalling the possible exis-
tence of ineﬃciencies. After liberalization, the emerging markets exhibit a behavior
much more similar to that in the developed countries: Even though bear phases still
34show some acceleration eﬀect at the end of the phase — mostly because of the ﬁnancial
crises of the late 1990s — the departures from what would be implied by statistical
models of market evolution — and the departures from the behavior in developed
economies — have been signiﬁcantly reduced.
O u ra n a l y s i si saﬁrst step that opens up a broad and ambitious research program.
Once the stock market cycles have been identiﬁe da n da n a l y z e di nt h e i ro w ns t a n c e ,
several related questions arise. First, what is the relationship between real cycles
and stock market cycles? Do recessions and expansions in emerging countries have
similar characteristics as bull and bear markets across countries and with respect to
the developed countries? Can the diﬀering characteristics of emerging stock markets,
and the changes in those characteristics, be traced to the real side? So far, little
work has been done on real cycles in emerging countries, mostly due to the lack of
adequate data.
Second, our ﬁnding of increased synchronicity in emerging stock markets raises
a causality question: Can the reasons be found in the real side of the economy —
increased convergence of fundamentals, increased symmetry in exogenous shocks that
hit the economies — or is it merely a ﬁnancial phenomenon — i.e. these countries just
“look similar” to outside investors that can now enter the newly liberalized markets?
This point raises the issue of whether emerging markets should indeed be considered
an “asset class” of their own.
Third, our results suggest that future work would beneﬁt from a deeper examina-
tion of the institutional aspects of emerging markets. Broad and potentially fruitful
questions arise such as the relationship between stock market behavior and institu-
tional depth and development — including both political and economic institutions —
35or the relationship between ﬁnancial liberalization and other economic changes that
emerging countries have gone through — trade liberalization or the privatization of
productive sectors.
Finally, from the ﬁnancial side, our results are important in the context of the lit-
erature of investment allocation and international risk diversiﬁcation. The eﬀects we
have identiﬁed after liberalization of the markets — that is, after the markets become
increasingly available for outside investors — seem to provide relevant information for
fund allocation. We have detected a higher synchronicity of emerging market behavior
— which could translate into lower beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation across emerging countries
— and also that returns and volatility both decrease with liberalization. These eﬀects
are likely to aﬀect signiﬁcantly the optimal allocation of investment funds. A related
question concerns the relationship of emerging stock markets with world portfolios:
Is this relationship diﬀerent during bull and bear phases? If it is, then again optimal
rules for fund allocation may be signiﬁcantly aﬀected.
As we can see, a number of interesting questions remain unanswered. We believe
that our analysis has given a ﬁrst step in the direction of gaining a deeper under-
standing of the behavior of stock markets, although much exciting work remains to
be done.
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42Table 1: Dates of the Peaks and Troughs




-. 1978:08 1979:04 1978:10
*!+,
-. 1980:02 1980:06 1980:11
*!+, 1981:03 1980:12
-. 1982:05 1981:06
*!+, 1982:10 1982:05 1982:12 1982:03 1982:07
-. 1983:04 1983:08 1983:06
*!+, 1983:08 1983:06 1983:11
-. 1984:03 1984:05 1984:02
*!+, 1984:05
-. 1984:12
*!+, 1985:05 1985:02 1985:05 1985:07 1986:05
-. 1985:09 1986:04 1987:09 1987:08
*!+, 1987:10 1987:12 1987:12 1987:11
-. 1988:07
*!+, 1988:12
-. 1988:09 1989:04 1989:03
*!+, 1989:02
-. 1990:03 1990:07 1990:05
*!+, 1990:12 1990:10 1990:08 1990:11 1990:10
-. 1991:07
*!+, 1992:07
-. 1992:05 1992:04 1992:06 1992:03
*!+, 1992:11 1992:11 1993:04 1992:09
-. 1994:01 1994:09 1994:10 1994:01 1993:12 1994:01
*!+, 1995:02 1995:03 1995:02 1995:01 1994:06
-. 1995:06 1996:01
*!+, 1996:12
-. 1997:09 1997:07 1997:07 1997:09
*!+, 1998:08 1999:01 1998:08 1998:09 1998:08 1998:08
-. 2000:02 2000:03 2000:01 1999:12 2000:03 1999:06 2000:08
Peaks and troughs for the US come from Pagan and Sossounov (2003). The last peak
identiﬁed for the US comes from our own calculation.
43Table 2: Characteristics of the Bull and Bear Markets for the Speciﬁc
Countries
PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE
$ 	 % &' ( % ) $
	!//
 20.2 20.3 23.7 18.4 26.7 21 31.9 26.8
 1.42 1.26 0.88 0.79 1.42 0.84 0.52 0.528
 0.045 -0.012 0.316 0.224 0.019 0.05 0.05 0.036
 0.143 0.116 0.066 0.075 0.084 0.058 0.026 0.034
	+ 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.43 0.86 0.67 0.86 0.88
	-
 15 14.3 15.5 18.1 15.7 26 8.7 13.6
 -1.23 -1.14 -0.69 -0.679 -1.13 -0.5 -0.14 -0.28
 -0.14 -0.09 -0.089 -0.077 0.076 -0.134 0.006 -0.025
 0.144 0.146 0.074 0.081 0.113 0.04 0.024 0.042
	− 1 1 0.83 0.71 1 0.67 0.14 0.4
Sample period for all countries is 1975:12 to 2001:01, thus yielding a total number of
observations of 302. For the US we use our own calculation using the peaks and troughs in
Pagan and Sossounov (2003) and the S&P500 index. For Germany we use the peaks and
troughs in Gómez Biscarri and Pérez de Gracia (2002), for the period 1970:01 to 1999:11.
D: Average duration in months
A: Average amplitude in % return (or loss)
EX: Excess from a triangle approximation
V: Volatility within the phase in average size of % return per month
B: Proportion of “big swings”
 Our own calculations.
44Table 2 (continued): Characteristics of the Bull and Bear Markets for
the SpeciﬁcC o u n t r i e s
PANEL B: PRE-REFORM (1975-1989 for the US and Germany)
$ 	 % &' ( % ) $
	!//
 15 20.7 36 19 23.3 20.3 28.3 25.4
 1.66 1.44 1.22 0.76 1.70 0.85 0.49 0.47
 0.065 -0.026 0.411 0.313 -0.182 0.02 -0.015 0.045
 0.178 0.144 0.066 0.069 0.099 0.069 0.029 0.036
	+ 1 0.67 0.5 0.5 1 0.67 0.75 0.6
	-
 18 17.5 22.5 13.6 21.3 21 12 8
 -1.56 -1.48 -1.31 -0.47 -1.5 -0.83 -0.18 -0.21
 -0.145 -0.086 -0.042 -0.058 0.147 -0.108 0.02 0.004
 0.157 0.137 0.09 0.074 0.114 0.068 0.024 0.036
	− 0.8 1 1 0.4 0.67 0.83 0.25 0.4
PANEL C: POST-REFORM (1990-2001 for the US and Germany)
$ 	 % &' ( % ) $
	!//
 25.5 16.5 17.5 17.7 29.3 19.7 36.7 24.7
 1.18 0.91 0.70 0.83 1.2 0.87 0.56 0.62
 0.082 0.123 0.127 0.098 0.162 -0.024 0.118 0.012
 0.122 0.093 0.065 0.084 0.074 0.08 0.023 0.039
	+ 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.33 0.75 0.33 0.67 1
	-
 10 17 12 29.5 10 16 4.3 7
 -0.69 -1.29 -0.38 -1.19 -0.76 -1.16 -0.08 -0.26
 0.088 0.107 0.002 0.039 0.135 -0.17 0.005 0.042
 0.106 0.153 0.06 0.088 0.11 0.12 0.025 0.059
	− 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 0 0.25
Sample period for all countries is 1975:12 to 2001:01, thus yielding a total number of
observations of 302. For the US we use our own calculation using the peaks and troughs in
Pagan and Sossounov (2003) and the S&P500 index. For Germany we use the peaks and
troughs in Gómez Biscarri and Pérez de Gracia (2002), for the period 1970:01 to 1999:11.
D: Average duration in months
A: Average amplitude in % return (or loss)
EX: Excess from a triangle approximation
V: Volatility within the phase in average size of % return per month
B: Proportion of “big swings”
 Our own calculations.
45Table 3: Concordance Index
PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE
 $ 	 % &' ( % )
$

 1 0.579 0.642 0.460 0.762 0.636 0.639
	0 1 0.5 0.536 0.586 0.387 0.483
%0 1 0.652 0.689 0.629 0.632
&' 1 0.586 0.659 0.483
(' 10 . 7 0 2  0.632
%0
 1 0.573
PANEL B: PRE-REFORM (1975-1989)
 $ 	 % &' ( % )
$

 1 0.426 0.639 0.420 0.604 0.586 0.586
	0 1 0.361 0.485 0.444 0.249 0.379
%0 1 0.627 0.751 0.627 0.686
&' 1 0.627 0.692 0.562
(' 10 . 7 1 0  0.568
%0
 10 . 5 5 0
PANEL C: POST-REFORM (1990-2001)
 $ 	 % &' ( % )
$

 1 0.774 0.647 0.511 0.962 0.699 0.707
	0 10 . 6 7 7  0.602 0.767 0.564 0.617
%0 1 0.684 0.609 0.632 0.564
&' 1 0.534 0.617 0.383
(' 1 0.692 0.714
%0
 1 0.602
The  indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% conﬁdence level with positive correlation.
 indicates signiﬁcant negative correlation. The conﬁdence intervals have been
calculated from simulated series using a random walk with drift and AR(1)
increments,
∆ =  + ∆−1 +   → (01)
that represents the best ﬁtting model to the stock market cycle characteristics.
Parameters of this model were estimated for all six countries, and then 10,000
series of length 302 were simulated and the  calculated. The 2.5% and 97.5%
quantiles of the simulated distribution of the  are used as critical values. The
speciﬁc values are available upon request. The  with respect to the US has
been calculated with the series of bullish/bearish markets for the US in Table
1.
46Table 4: Simple Correlations of Returns
PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE
 $ 	 % &' ( %
$

 1 0.03 0.17 -0.0256 0.192 0.084
	0 1 0.112 0.076 0.104 0.091
%0 1 0.129 0.225 0.223
&' 1 0.137 0.376
(' 10 . 2 6 2 
%0
 1
PANEL B: PRE-REFORM (1975-1989)
 $ 	 % &' ( %
$

 1 -0.07 0.114 -0.11 0.106 -0.011
	0 1 -0.04 0.074 0.067 -0.071
%0 1 0.041 0.153 0.121
&' 1 0.071 -0.011
(' 10 . 2 5 5 
%0
 1
PANEL C: POST-REFORM (1990-2001)
 $ 	 % &' ( %
$

 1 0.306 0.433 0.124 0.555 0.283
	0 10 . 3 9 2  0.086 0.407 0.201
%0 1 0.257 0.422 0.381




The  indicate that the  in Table 4 is outside of the 5% conﬁdence interval
and shows positive correlation.  indicates signiﬁcant negative correlation.
47Bull Bear Bull Bear Bull Bear Bull Bear Bull Bear Bull Bear
Model I Lower CV 0.195 -0.216 0.1036 -0.196 0.153 -0.081 0.0854 -0.124 0.1382 -0.178 0.0816 -0.141
FULL Upper CV 0.388 -0.085 0.2148 -0.09 0.2939 -0.018 0.1769 -0.052 0.2839 -0.077 0.1638 -0.061
Model II Lower CV 0.1432 -0.335 0.0931 -0.284 0.1118 -0.07 0.1253 -0.09 0.1169 -0.15 0.0682 -0.362
SAMPLE Upper CV 0.3785 -0.108 0.2647 -0.109 0.2206 -0.018 0.2611 -0.015 0.2488 -0.055 0.33 -0.07
Model IIILower CV 0.1013 -0.282 0.1006 -0.296 0.1141 -0.067 0.1439 -0.096 0.1533 -0.136 0.0628 -0.203
Upper CV 0.3397 -0.141 0.2502 -0.125 0.2211 -0.011 0.2549 -0.009 0.2988 -0.043 0.1856 -0.086
Model I Lower CV 0.2381 -0.264 0.0888 -0.232 0.1839 -0.087 0.1308 -0.054 0.153 -0.219 0.1106 -0.045
1975 Upper CV 0.4938 -0.103 0.1922 -0.113 0.3578 -0.007 0.2532 0.005 0.3279 -0.1 0.2141 0.0057
- Model II Lower CV 0.1328 -0.407 0.1242 -0.08 0.2073 -0.043 0.1072 -0.24 0.06 -0.085
1989 Upper CV 0.3275 -0.179 0.2457 -0.02 0.405 0.0852 0.2522 -0.095 0.1468 -0.027
Model IIILower CV 0.1273 -0.333 0.1667 -0.089 0.2104 -0.04 0.1486 -0.168 0.0384 -0.078
Upper CV 0.3857 -0.178 0.334 -0.01 0.3992 0.0747 0.3212 -0.065 0.1155 -0.043
Model I Lower CV 0.1299 -0.132 0.1337 -0.154 0.1078 -0.074 0.0594 -0.234 0.1305 -0.156 0.0623 -0.266
1990 Upper CV 0.2658 -0.051 0.258 -0.065 0.2138 -0.021 0.139 -0.112 0.2605 -0.063 0.1423 -0.131
- Model II Lower CV 0.1742 -0.089 0.1373 -0.106 0.1015 -0.084 0.0705 -0.167 0.1356 -0.105 0.079 -0.221
2001 Upper CV 0.343 -0.015 0.269 -0.034 0.2064 -0.026 0.1723 -0.068 0.2688 -0.033 0.1925 -0.097
Model IIILower CV 0.0856 -0.099 0.1163 -0.176 0.0752 -0.095 0.1214 -0.223 0.1137 -0.172 0.0866 -0.303
Upper CV 0.1664 -0.039 0.2436 -0.078 0.1586 -0.041 0.2218 -0.026 0.248 -0.075 0.1663 -0.114
The missing CV's for Brazil represent that the estimated parameters did not yield a stationary process for the variance, which
therefore prevented the EX index from being simulated
Table 5
Simulated Critical Values of the EX index
MEX THAI ARG BRA CHI KORC) A Bear Market with EX>0 D) A Bear Market with EX<0
A) A Bull Market with EX>0 B) A Bull Market with EX<0
A
D
Figure 1: Shape of the Bull / Bear Phases and value of the Excess measure. Of course,
the axes correspond to time and stock prices. Consequently, D corresponds to our measure
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Figure 2: Country Stock Indexes. Evolution of (Log) Prices, 1975-2001. Bullish Phases





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Argentina. Comparison of rolling correlation indexes of simple returns (dashed


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Brazil. Comparison of rolling correlation indexes of simple returns (dashed line)




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Chile. Comparison of rolling correlation indexes of simple returns (dashed line)
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Mexico, Korea and Thailand. Comparison of rolling correlation indexes of
simple returns (dashed line) and rolling concordance indexes of bull/bear states (solid line).
The rolling window has size 50.
54